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S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001954

SIPDIS

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BRUSSELS FOR LEGATT

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TAGS: [ASEC](#) [PTER](#) [NL](#)

SUBJECT: EMBASSY THE HAGUE SECURITY MEASURES: PROMISE OF
GOOD NEWS ON AUGUST 5

REF: A. (A) STATE 166129

[B.](#) (B) THE HAGUE 1294

[C.](#) (C) THE HAGUE 1293

[D.](#) (D) THE HAGUE 1915

[E.](#) (E) THE HAGUE 1913

[F.](#) (F) THE HAGUE 1904

[G.](#) (G) THE HAGUE 1847

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DANIEL R. RUSSEL FOR REASON 1.5 (B) and (D).

[1.](#) (C) The Dutch security "triangle" chaired by National Coordinator for Security Jonge Vos and including representatives from the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Foreign Affairs, Defence, and AVID (security service)), met late August 4 to review Embassy The Hague security. The results of the meeting are strictly embargoed until Thursday, August 5, when the written report will be prepared and presented first to the local authorities in The Hague and then to the U.S. Embassy. However, Charge learned unofficially from participants in the meeting -- in strict confidence -- that the triangle endorsed the request in Embassy's July 30 dip note (Ref B) -- reinforced by DAS Davies meeting with Dutch DCM the same day (Ref A). Embassy source shared in confidence that the Triangle agreed to invoke Article 16 of the Dutch Police law, which permits the central authorities to issue a written 'advisory notice' to the local government (which under Dutch law has nearly absolute discretion on matters of public safety). The advisory will call on the City of The Hague to take increased measures specifically to strengthen the anti-ram traffic barriers next to the embassy -- "in the shortest possible timeframe." CDA was told that "this time we really mean business" and the city authorities are expected to comply "promptly." Jonge Vos' office separately said he would be in touch with Charge directly before the end of the day August 5 to convey the official decision, and underscored that no information could be provided to the USG until the city had first been informed. We expect to get a better sense on Thursday what the likely timeframe would be for constructing a concrete or metal barrier and any other improvements.

[2.](#) (S/NF) Embassy has used recent surveillance incidents (refs C,D,E,F) to push hard for a reversal of the Triangle position that a decision on security upgrades should be left to the City of the Hague. In the preceding 72 hours, Charge, RSO and Ambassador Sobel (from overseas) had frequently met or phoned all senior decision-makers in the Dutch government to press for action on an anti-ram barrier as a top priority, as well as additional security measures previously requested by the embassy. Our contacts emphasized they were building a rationale for taking new measures as required by the arcane and complex Dutch system. ORCA reinforced with AIVD the serious nature of surveillance incidents and provided information regarding upgrade in threat levels in the U.S. as well. In the Dutch security system (hopefully to be revised by early 2005 per ref G), triangle security decisions rest heavily on AIVD judgment of the explicit threat against a particular facility. In the event, it appears that the triangle concluded that the direct threats against the embassy were insufficient to elevate its status from the current "high" to "critical." However, they did agree that there was justification for issuing the advisory to provide elevated protection within the "high" category.
RUSSEL